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THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POWER OF A
STATE UNDER A RESERVED RIGHT TO
-AMEND OR REPEAL CHARTERS OF INCORPORATION.
(Continued from page 47.)
II. THE CORPORATORS INTER SE AND THE STATE.

When two or more persons wish to enter into a partnership for the transaction of business they commonly draw up
articles of agreement which are to determine the relations
to exist among them-the scope and nature of the enterprise,
the voice that each shall have in its management, the method
and proportion in which the profits arising from the enterprise are to be divided. The law does not require that they
first secure from the state any distinctive franchise or privileges, inasmuch as the common law always recognized the
right of a person to embark in a mercantile enterprise, which
was then subject only to the taxing and police powers of
the state.
Similarly the common law recognized the right of association of individuals into what we now term "unincorporated
associations"-organizations formed usually for social, beneficial, or like purposes. Persons entering into such associa73
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tions also may and usually do draw up articles of association
regulating their joint and respective rights of property, management, and other interests, and the courts will enforce such
agreements or by-laws as the organic contract determining
the status and rights of membership in such organizations.
In the case of the corporation the same underlying conception of a voluntary association exists. In fact, such an
association is formed in just the same manner as a partnership or an unincorporated association. The corporators
meet and determine upon the kind of enterprise in which
they wish to embark their capital; they decide upon the
amount of capital to be employed, the extent of interest
which each corporator is to have in the property and dividends arising from the investment and exploitation of the
capital, the officers and directors who are to manage the
conduct of the business, and the power which each of such
officers is to have; they thus provide a scheme of organization and membership-of true partnership. Having effected
such an organization, they might step out at once into the
mercantile world and launch their enterprise as a business
partnership without securing any charter or franchise at all.
But if they wish to conduct their venture under certain privileged conditions-as, for example, if they, wish their organization to have the right of perpetual succession, to be able
to sue and to be sued in a common name, to have a joint
or corporate seal, and the members to trade subject only to
a limited liability to creditors-they must, to secure these
privileges, first obtain a corporate license from the state;
they must get the right to be a corporation. The franchise
of incorporation, therefore, is nothing more than a license
from the state to do business under certain privileged conditions. The franchise does not constitute-the association;
it is a gift by the state to the association. The incorporation does not create the organization any more than an automobile license creates an automobile. The automobile is
brought to a municipality to be licensed under its police regulations to do certain things-to be operated and run within
certain governmental limits; so the corporation comes, fully
existent, fully organized, to the state and asks the state for
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the license or privilege of trading in a corporate capacity.
Therefore the contract of association among the corporators exists wholly independently of the state-as much so as
does any contract drawn up between two private individuals
or among several individuals; the state uses this contract
merely as a basis upon which to formulate its own contract
with the corporators-the contract which we call then the
charter of incorporation.
If this be true, it is to be noted, then, that the real contract existing among the corporators is entered upon by
them prior to the actual incorporation of the association or
group. Unfortunately, however, the charter which the state
grants to the association frequently purports to set out the
essential terms of this prior contract or agreement, so that
the confusion arises which causes the more or less prevailing belief that the charter given by the state to the corporation gives to it not only a contractual right and a contractual
liability with reference to the state itself, but also all the
contractual rights and liabilities existing among the corporators themselves. The state, instead of granting a mere tag
or numbered card, as in the case of the automobile, insists
that the charter license shall itself set forth the nature of
the corporate enterprise, the amount of the capital stock,
the number and names of the directors and officers of the
association-in short, all the essential parts of the agreement previously entered into by the corporators, but not, in
most cases, formally drawn up and executed by them until
the application for the charter itself, which first embodies
the formal expression of this prior agreement. From this
mere circumstance of physical identity-an identity to be
regretted, for much "bad" law might have been avoided
were these two contracts expressed in totally distinct instruments--comes the trite statement that the charter of a corporation constitutes a contract, not only between the state and
the corporation under the doctrine of the Dartmouth College
Case, but also as among the stockholders or corporators
themselves.
"Says Cook (on Corporations, Vol. II, Sec. 669): "That
a charter constitutes a contract between the corporation and
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its stockholders is a principle of law that has become firmly
imbedded in the jurisprudence of modem times. Upon this
principle of law rest the stability, permanence, and honesty
of management of many corporations, particularly those of
railroads, and from it arises much of the confidence, safety,
and protection of the stockholder himself. It was first
promulgated in America in 182o in Livingston v. Lynch, 4
Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 573, and was applied to corporations in
Hartford and New Haven R. R. Co. v. Croswell, 5 Hill
(N. Y.), 383 (1843), and in England, in 1824, in Natusck
v. Irving.63 These cases have been followed by a long list of
supporting decisions. They were the first to establish clearly
the doctrine that any act or proposed act of the corporation,
or of the directors, or of a majority of the stockholders,
which is not within the express or implied powers of the
charter of incorporation or of association-in other words,
any ultra vires act-is a breach of the contract between the
corporation and each one of its stockholders, and that consequently any one or more of the stockholders may object
thereto and compel the corporation to observe the terms of
the contract as set forth in the charter."
Says Morawetz (on Private Corporations, Vol. II, Sec.
1047) : "Whatever doubt there may be as to the correctness of the doctrine that a charter of incorporation embodies
a contract between the state and the corporators, there can
be no doubt that the charter of an ordinary business corporation embodies a contract among the corporators themselves.
The shareholders of such a corporation mutually agree to
unite for the purposes indicated in their charter. Each shareholder agrees to contribute his proportionate share of the
capital of the association, and each, in return, becomes entitled to a share in the profits and in the management of the
corporate affairs. The agreement thus created-is, in the
strictest sense of the word, a contract, and every reason
exists for treating it as a contract within the meaning of the
provision of the Constitution of the United States that no
state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts."
Gow on Partnership, 398; also 2 Cooper's Ch. 358.
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-Says Thompson (Commentaries on the Law of Corporations, Vol. I, Sec. 71) : "The relation between a corporation and a stockholder is one of contract, and hence any
legislative enactment which, without the assent of the stockholders, authorizes a material change in the powers or purposes of the corporation not in aid of its original object is
not binding upon him." . . . Nor can the legislature, in an
amendatory act, "authorize the majority to accept the
amendment so as to bind the minority, because this would
have the effect of impairing the obligation of the contract
entered into among the corporation, the majority and the
minority in the original subscription."
From these well-recognized principles-to be criticised
only because of their assuming that the charter constitutes
the contract among the stockholders in any sense other than
that already explained-result the numerous decisions which
hold that the state cannot, under the Federal Constitution,
amend or authorize the amendment of the charter in such
manner as to violate the contract which it expresses as having been determined upon by the corporators in entering
upon the corporate enterprise. If the state directly enacts an
amendment of the charter, it is violating the Dartmouth
College decision by impairing the obligation of the contract existing between itself and the corporation. If the
state merely authorizes an amendment of the charter, or of
the general scope and purpose of the enterprise,-that is,
passes an act permitting some, or a majority, or any number of the corporators less than all, to change the charter, the
nature of the enterprise, or the management of the corporation,-it is impairing the obligation of the contract eikisting
among the corporators, and is violating the provision of the
Federal Constitution no less than before. The corporators
having agreed that they will enter upon the pursuit of a
certain business, that they will divide their profits in a certain proportion, and elect under a certain system those who
are actively to fhanage the conduct of their business, the
state cannot subsequently impair this contract, whether the
persons carry out their venture on a partnership basis, or
whether they incorporate and thus enter into a further con-
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tract as a group or association with the state; if they incorporate, the only effect is that the state has now two contracts
which it cannot impair where in a partnership it would have

had but one. In short, just as the state cannot impair a
contract of partnership or any other contract between
individuals, so it cannot impair a contract among stockholders or incorporators, and this independently of any principle of the Dartmouth College Case at all. Of course, it
may legislate with respect to the corporate contract without
necessarily impairing its obligation. It may enact or authorize amendments which are merely auxiliary to the purposes of the corporation, and such amendments may be
accepted by a majority of the stockholders with the effect
64
of binding all the stockholders whether assenting or not.
So it may decree or authorize insignificant and immaterial
changes in the corporate design, 65 just as it may in the case
of all contracts. But when the amendments proposed are
fundamental, radical, or vital, the assent to such amendments by the stockholders must be unanimous, for any dissenting stockholder is either relieved by such unauthorized
amendment from liability on his stock subscription, or, if he
chooses, he may enjoin his fellow corporators from adopting
it and from attempting any fundamental change in the original purpose of the association. He can insist that there be
no consolidation with another corporation without his assent,
that the funds of the corporation shall not be devoted to a
"'Thompson on Corporations, vol. i, sec. 68: "This rule does not extend so far as to prevent the legislature from enacting amendments to
a charter in furtherance of the original design, on the application of
the corporation or of a majority of the members ....
The mere grant
of auxiliary powers to enable the corporation the better to carry out
the original design, does not constitute such a radical and fundamental
change in the objects and purposes for which the original company was
chartered, as places the amendment within the category of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts. Instead of impairing the obligation of the contract expressed in the charter, it aids and effectuates it"
(citing many cases).
'Banet v. Alton and Sangamon R. R. Co., 13 Ill. 513 (1851) ; Fry's
Executor v. Lexington and Big Sandy R. R. Co., 2 Metc. (Ky.) 314
(1859) ; Cross v. Peach Bottom Railway Co., go Pa. St. 392 (1879) ;
Peoria and Rock Island R. R. Co. v. Preston, 35 Iowa, 115 (1872);
Chattanooga, Rome and Columbus R. R. Co. v. Warthen, 98 Ga. 599
(1896).
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different purpose than that originally agreed upon and stated
in the charter, that they shall not be subjected to a different
method of management, nor be divided in a diffcrent proportion among the stockholders. 66 And none of these
changes can be made any the less invalid by reason of the
fact that they are sanctioned by legislative authority, since
the state cannot impair the obligation of the contract among
the stockholders. In all of these cases the dissenting stockholder may well say, and with entire judicial approval,
"Non hacc in foedera veni."
Here we have the ground upon which, it is suggested, the
Dartmouth College decision not only might but should have
been placed-the ground upon which it not only was a possible and justifiable decision, but would have been a proper
and necessary one. The facts of this historic case were,
that by the original charter of Dartmouth College granted
by the Crown in the year 1769, twelve persons, therein
named, were incorporated by the name of "The Trustees
of Dartmouth College." Under the charter these trustees
had authority to fill all vacancies which might arise in their
own body. By an act of the legislature of New Hampshire
passed in I8M6 the charter was amended, the number of
trustees being increased to twenty-one. The appointment
of the nine additional members was vested in the Governor
of the state, and a board of overseers was created, consisting of twenty-five persons (all of whom were executive officers of the states of New Hampshire and Vermont), who
were to have the power to control the most important acts of
the trustees, including the appointment of all officers of the
college. The Governor and Council of New Hampshire were
to fill all vacancies which might occur in the board of trustees prior to its first meeting. A majority of the trustees
Clearwater v. Meredith, i Wall. 25 (1863); Hartford and New
Haven, R. R. Co. v. Croswell, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 383 (1843); Knoxville
v. Knoxville and Ohio R. R. Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 758 (1884); Black v.
Delaware and Raritan Canal Co., 24 N. J. Eq. 455 (873). ; Manheim,
Petersburg and Lancaster Plankroad Co. v. Arndt, 31 Pa. St. 317
(1858); Lauman, v. Lebanon Valley R. R. Co., 30 Pa. St. 42 (1858);
State v. Greer, 78 Mo. 188 (1883) ; Tucker v. Russell, 82 Fed. Rep. 263

(1897).
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of the college refused to accept this amended charter, and'
brought suit for the corporate property, which was in the
possession of a person holding by authority of the Act of
1816. The question involved was the constitutionality of
the Act of 1816 under the Federal restriction upon the impairment by a state of the obligation of contracts.
Instead of sustaining the artificial position that the charter constituted a contract between the state and the corporation, was there not here, in fact, another contract expressed
in the charter which the state undoubtedly was without
power to impair? Had not the trustees agreed among themselves that they were to be twelve in number and no more?
That they were to fill vacancies arising in their own body?
That they were to have full and sole control over the affairs
of the corporation? That they were to be the owners of the
corporate property in trust for the corporate purposes-via.,
the foundation and maintenance of an institution for the
education of such young men as might seek the instruction
which it offered? What right, then, had the state of New
Hampshire to annul, amend, or alter this contract, a contract entered into presumably before the granting of the
charter and merely expressed subsequently in the charter as
a statement of the organization and purposes of the corporate body? Did the state gain any power over this contract, to which it was not a party, simply by licensing the
association thus organized to enter upon its proposed undertaking in a corporate capacity? By giving to the association the franchise to exist as a corporation, it could not
acquire the right to violate a contract which the .Constitution of the United States had forbidden it to impair. Had
the trustees of Dartmouth College never incorporated, but
conducted the college under the form of a partnership or
unincorporated association, the state certainly could not
have impaired such contract of partnership. It could not
have said to the trustee partners: "You have agreed that
you shall manage your affairs in a certain manner and under
a certain system; we now decree that you shall manage
them in a different manner and under a different system.
The twelve of you have agreed to be partners in this enter-
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prise; we enact that there shall be twenty-one partners, and
we shall name the other nine whom you must allow to enter
into your association, and we shall name new partners in
case any of you resign or die. We shall also appoint a body
of strangers to control your acts and supervise the management of your own enterprise." The mere statement of such
a proposition shows its inherent absurdity, and if the state
could not have taken this position in the case of such a partnership, it could not have done so in the case of an association which has obtained the license of incorporation. What
the Dartmouth College decision in fact held was that this
incorporation created a second contract, a contract between
the association and the state, and that the state could not
change the scheme of management or any other of the charter provisions, because to have done so would have been to
impair this second contract. It is contended, for reasons
set forth in the first part of this paper, that the relationship
between the state and the association arising from the act
of incorporation is in no sense a contractual relation, and
that the true contract was the one existing between the corporators as expressed in the charter,-the contract dealing
with the scope and nature of the corporate enterprise and
the management of the corporate property and affairs,-a
contract existing independently of the act of incorporation.
The Dartmouth College Case did not deny the existence of
this contract: it ignored it. But what it is important for
us to note is that, if the Dartmouth College decision be correct, there are two distinct contracts the obligation of which
cannot constitutionally be impaired by the state, and it remains for us to consider whether a power reserved to revoke
or amend the one has or can have any effect over or in regard
to the other.
The Dartmouth College Case held that a charter of incorporation is a contract between the state and the corporation,
the obligation of which cannot be impaired by the state. To
meet this decision the states, as we have seen, adopted in
their constitutions and general statutes clauses reserving
to themselves, in the case of all subsequently granted charters, the right to repeal or amend them. We have already
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shown that the state can reserve such a right, not as a sovereignty, but only as a party to a contract into which it
itself has entered. Can the reserved power to alter or
repeal be a power to alter or repeal a contract to which
the state is not itself a party? Can the state constitutionally
reserve to itself such a power? Suppose that a state were
to pass an act, or adopt a clause in its constitution, which
purported to reserve to the state the right to alter, amend,
or annul all contracts subsequently entered into between private persons. Would such an act be constitutional? Mr.
Justice Story says (Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States, Vol. II, Secs. 1383-1384) in answer to
the argument that "If the legislature should provide by a
law that all contracts thereafter made should be subject to
the entire control of the legislature, as to their obligation,
validity, and execution, whatever might be their terms, they
would be completely within the legislative power, and might
be impaired or extinguished by future laws, thus having a
complete ex post facto operation," that this is not true, because such a law would not enter into and form a part of all
contracts thereafter made. "Although the law of the place
acts upon a contract," he says, "and governs its construction, validity, and obligation, it constitutes no part of it.
• . . To such an extent the law acts upon contracts. It
performs the office of interpretation. But this is very different from supposing that every law applicable to the subject
matter, as a statute of limitations or a statute of insolvency,
enters into the contract and becomes a part of the contract."
As a matter of fact, Mr. Justice Story has not been sustained
in these statements by the courts. The law of the place does
enter into the contract and form a part of it. " It is settled,"
says Mr. Justice Swayne in Von Hoffiman v. City of Quincy,
4 Wall. 535 (I866), "that the laws which subsist at the
time and place of the making of a contract and where it is
to be performed enter into and form a part of it, as if they
were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This
principle embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement."
And the same
Justice says, in substantially the same language, in Walker
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v. Whitehead, i6 Wall. 314 (1872):

"The laws which

exist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and
where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of
it. This embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement." And this is said to
be an "axiom in our jurisprudence." 11
But although Story would seem to be incorrect in the reasons which he assigns for his opinion, his conclusion itself
is unquestionable. No state can pass a general act providing
that contracts (to which it is not itself a party) shall be subject to any future laws which it may pass, and by such general act hope to avoid the inhibition in the Constitution
against the impairment of the obligation of contracts, by
the argument that any subsequent law cannot impair the
contract, since the contract was made from the beginning
subject to this reserved power and therefore embodied as one
of its terms the possibility of revocation or amendment by
the state. The reason why such an act would be held unconstitutional is not, perhaps, so much because of any theoretically logical reason compelling that view of the problem,
but rather because it would be in practice a manifest evasion
of the impairment of the obligation of contracts clause in the
Constitution, an evasion rendering that clause a dead letter
simply by the introduction of such a nullifying clause in
the constitution of every state-a clause reserving over contracts a power which is denied to the state by the Federal
Constitution. It is true that if the state passes an act relating to contracts,-for example, prescribing the rate of interest to attach to money due under the contract, or providing for exemption laws, or regulating the time and manner of performance,-such provisions all enter as terms of
contracts subsequently entered into within that jurisdiction.
But where the state passes an act not prescribing definite
terms or regulations, but merely reserving the right subsequently to enact such regulations, it is not thereby enacting
a law, but is reserving a power---;a power forbidden to it by
" To the same effect is Mr. Justice Miller, " Lectures on the Constitution of the United States," lecture xi, page 531.
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the provision of the Constitution which forbids the impair-

ment of the obligation of contracts.
Let us consider as an example the case of Goenen v.
Schroeder,8 Minn. 387 (1863), in which the state of Minnesota passed an act allowing for the redemption of mortgages
"one year or such other time as may be prescribed by law."
Subsequently an act was passed increasing the time for redemption to three years, and the question was whether this
act was constitutional with reference to mortgages executed
between the time of the passage of these two acts. The
court held that it was not. "It is an attempt," said the
court, "to reserve to the legislature powers which it does not
otherwise possess." If the original act had provided for a
redemption of one year, a subsequent act changing the redemption period to three years .would clearly have been
invalid. How then could the state reserve to itself the power
to make such a subsequent change in the redemption period?
To say that the mortgagor and mortgagee entered into the
contract knowingly subject to this reservation of power on
the part of the state is manifestly a begging of the entire
question, because the parties had no choice in the matter,
and therefore had to submit to this provision of the state
only if the law in question was valid-that is, only if the
state had the constitutional power to create for itself this
reserved authority.
We arrive, therefore, at this conclusion-that the state, in
reserving to itself the power to amend or annul a contract
to which it is a party, not only does not thereby reserve the
right to amend or revoke a contract to which it is not a
party, but that it cannot constitutionally reserve such a
power, because to do so would be to create for itself by its
own fiat a power which the Constitution of the United States
says that it shall not possess. The state can reserve the
power to annul or alter contracts into which it has itself
entered only, as has been already pointed out, on the same
principle that any private party to a contract can reserve a
similar power. It reserves the power as a party to the contract and not as a sovereignty; the reservation is a term
of the contract stipulated for by one of the parties thereto.
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But the state cannot reserve a power to amend other people's
contracts any more than can a private individual.
When we apply the results thus reached to the subject
under investigation, we see at once to what conclusion such
an application will lead. The question is: Does the state
in incorporating an association, and at the same time reserving to itself the right to repeal or amend the charter, gain
thereby the right to annul or amend the charter among the
incorporators-a contract into which they have entered independently of the state's grant of corporate franchises?
The answer is that it does not, and the chief reason for the
answer is that it cannot. As far as the charter is, under
the Dartmouth College decision, a contract between the
state and the corporation, the state may alter or revoke it.
If the Dartmouth College decision was unfortunate, its effects
have been wholly avoided by the reserved power clauses,
which bring the state back to the position it would have
occupied had the Dartmouth College Case been decided the
other way. But so far as the charter is merely an embodiment of a contract entered into among the stockholders, and
into which they might have entered just as well had they
been forming a partnership or an unincorporated association without asking any franchises or privileges from the
state, the state cannot impair its obligation, could not have
impaired its obligation even if there had never been a Dartmouth College Case. No reserved power can give to the
state that right. The state cannot reserve the right to
change the contract of the corporators inter se any more
than it can reserve a general right to change all private contracts, and it makes no'difference that the terms of the corporators' contract may be set forth in the charter which the
state reserves the right to alter or repeal. Clear thought will
not be misled by this circumstance. The franchises, the privileges, the exemptions granted by the state in the act of incorporation are all at the mercy of the grantor if the power
to repeal be reserved; the internal management of the corporation, the right5 of the corporators inter se, questions of
the scope of the enterprise, distribution-of the assets, regulation of the corporate affairs-all these are beyond the power
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of the state to modify whether there be or be not a reserved
power of revocation or amendment of the charter. 8
Leaving for a moment the theoretical analysis of the
problem, and considering the history of the reserved power
clauses in the state statutes and constitutions, are we not
brought to the same conclusion as to the intended scope of
the powers thus reserved? Why and when were these
clauses introduced into our jurisprudence? Was it not, in
the main, after the Dartmouth College Case, and to meet
the decision there rendered, that the state could not impair
its contract with the corporation? Was it not because of
the fear that the state could not control or recall the franchises which it had granted? Was there any apprehension
of danger arising from the fact that the contract of the
stockholders as to the nature and management of the corporate affairs was beyond state control? On the contrary,
the fear of state interference with private contracts had dictated Art. I, Sec. IO, of the Federal Constitution. What
these reserved power clauses were intended to accomplish
was the prevention of the grant to corporations of irrepealable franchises. They were to prevent irrevocable gifts of
privileges by the state, not to place under state control rights,
powers, and contractual obligations which had not been
given by the state. So that whether we study the problem
from an historical or from a legal standpoint, the same result is attained-namely, a confirmation of the contention
that the reserved power gives to the state no right over those
features of corporate existence which are not dependent
upon the charter of incorporation for their creation and
legal status.
Coming, now, with these considerations in view, to examine the decisions in the reported cases, it must be admitted
at the outset that they are almost all contrary to the argument here presented. In but a few of them is the question
'The corporators may, of course, agree inter se that a majority of
the stockholders should have the piower to change the contract of association in any of its terms, or that the state should have such power,
the corporators being bound by the state's acts. But this would not be
giving to the state any rights or power which it could enforce.
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so much as discussed; in fewer, if any, is it adequately considered. This is the more remarkable both because of the
importance of the subject and because of the eminence of
the tribunals and jurists who have been called upon to express their opinion in regard to it. The decision adverse to
the views above advanced is usually reached upon the basis
of one of two statements, both of which, it is submitted, are
erroneous. One is that "If the charter, or an existing constitutional provision or general law, reserves to the legislature a plenary right of alteration or repeal, then the coadventurers, by accepting the charter or the general enabling
act and organizing under it, consent that future legislatures
may exercise that right; and it seems to be an untenable
view that they may repudiate that consent and fly in the
face of future legislation which takes place under a right
thus reserved." 69 The other is that "In my judgment the
reservation is to be interpreted as placing the state legislature back on the same platform of power and control over the
charter containing it as it would have occupied had the constitutional restriction about contracts never existedY
The first of these arguments amounts, in substance, to
this: that if a charter is subject to a power reserved in the
state to alter or repeal it, every corporator enters into the
contract with his fellow corporators knowingly subject to
such reserved power, and therefore he cannot later be heard
to complain if the power be exercised so as to change this
contract. But this argument would justify the. constitutionality of every law to which it might in the reason of
things be capable of application. In one sense every person
must deal with reference to the existence of legislative enactments, but submission to the law is not a voluntary act; if
an act be otherwise unconstitutional, the mere fact that persons have contracted apparently under the force and sway
of its authority will not make it any the less objectionable.
The true question is, Has the state the constitutional right
Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Corporations, vol. iv, sec.

5417.
"0Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley in the Sinking-Fund
Cases, 99 U. S. 700 (1878), page 748. See also Detroit v. Detroit and
Howell Plankroad-Co.,43 Mich. 14o (i88o).
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to compel its citizens, if they wish to enter into'a contract,
to enter into it subject to a power reserved over the contract? If it can do so in the case of a contract among corporators, it can do so in that of a partnership contract. It
may reserve the right to alter or annul all contracts thereafter entered into, and justify such reservation by the argument that since the contract was entered into subject to this
reserved power, no subsequent exercise of the power can
be said to impair the contract. We have seen that such an
attempted reservation of power would be unconstitutional
and void, that it would be the attempted creation of a forbidden power, and not a law entering into contracts as one
of the terms thereof. It is, therefore, difficult to understand
the force of the argument that a state may impair the obligation of the contract existing among the corporators because
they have incorporated their asssociation subject to the
state's right of revocation or amendment. Moreover, it
may be said, in further reply to this argument, that if the
stockholders incorporate with- knowledge of the reserved
power, they have knowledge also of the fact that the state is
forbidden by the Constitution to impair the obligation of
contracts. As has been well said in reference to a somewhat
different phase of this subject: "It is said that the company, having accepted its charter with full knowledge of the
fact that the legislature had retained the right to alter and
amend it, must be regarded as waiving the protection of
any constitutional provision, and consenting in advance to
any amendment the legislature might see fit to make, and,
therefore, it is bound thereby as matter of contract. It
must be remembered, however, that while the company,
when it accepted its charter, must be regarded as having
done so with notice of the fact that the legislature reserved
the right to amend, yet it, at the same time, had notice of
the several provisions of the Constitution placing limitations upon the legislative power, and therefore it had a right
to assume that the legislature could and would only exercise the reserved right to amend within the limitations prescribed by the Constitution. Hence it cannot properly be
said that the corporation, by accepting its charter with no-
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tice of the reserved right to amend, consented that the legislature might make any amendment to its charter, but only
such as it could make within the limitations prescribed by
the Constitution. It could not assume, or even anticipate,
that the legislature would violate the law of its existence,
and undertake to do that which the people, in their sovereign
capacity, had forbidden it from doing." 71
•The second aigument above stated as seeking to justify
the state's control over the contract of the corporators inter
se also may be said to beg the question-to be the statement of a result rather than the reason theref6r. Is it true
that the reservation clauses restore the states to the plane
of sovereignty which they would have occupied had there
been no clause in the Federal Constitution forbidding the
impairment of the obligation of contracts? The Constitution siys that the states shall not impair any contracts. Does
the reservation in contracts to which the state is a party of
the power to alter or annul them give to the state the right
to annul or amend all contracts, including those to which it
is not a party? Evidently not. All that the reserved power
accomplishes, and all that it constitutionally can accomplish,
is to restore the power of the state to the plane which it
would have occupied had the Dartmouth College Case held
that a charter of incorporation does not constitute a contract
between the corporation and the state. It was meant to
counteract that decision and to relieve the state of the limitations placed by it upon the right to alter the state's own
contracts; it was intended to give to the state the right to
repeal or amend acts of incorporation in the same way .and to
the same extent that it can repeal or amend all of its other
acts or statutes. The reservation clauses do not nullify Art.
I, Sec. io, of the Constitution, but only the special interpretation given to that section by the Dartmouth College
decision.
In the light of these principles, let us examine the cases
which have dealt with this problem, and let us consider first
'Dissenting

opinion of Mr. Justice McIver in Railroad Co. v. Gibbes,

27 S. C. 385 (1887).
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those which represent the opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States. In Miller v. The State, 15 Wall. 478
(I8"72), the facts were that the legislature of New York in
1851 passed an act enabling the city of Rochester to subscribe for and hold stock in the Rochester and Genesee Railroad Company (a corporation subject to the reserved power)
to an amount not exceeding $3o0,000, and in case the company should elect to receive its subscription the Common
Councils of the city were authorized to nominate and appoint one director of the company for every $75,000 of capital stock held by the city. The railroad company accepted
the subscription of the city on these terms to the amoint of
$300,000. In 1865 the legislature enacted that the Common
Councils of Rochester should thereafter nominate and appoint one director of the company for every $42,857.14 of
capital stock held by the city, thus giving to the city the
right to appoint seven instead of four of the directors of
the company. The question involved was that of the constitutionality of this Act of 1865. There was no doubt that,
under the facts of the case, the city of Rochester had become
one of the stockholders of the company under a definite
agreement with the corporation as to the powers which it
was to have as such stockholder. The Supreme Court of
New York sustained the act, 72 saying, per judge Welles,
that the case was "plainly distinguishable from the case of a
contract between the railroad company and a stranger in
relation to a matter having no connection with, or reference
to, the organization of the company-for example, a contract between it and an individual for the purchase of a
locomotive engine. In such a case there is a legal contract
between two persons, an artificial and a natural one, the
obligation of which no state legislation could impair. But
the case under consideration is where the legislature undertakes, in the exercise of its reserved powers, to alter fundamentally the articles of association or charter of the railroad corporation. This power I have shown, I think, it
possesses." The decision thus reached was reversed in the
" People ex rel., etc., v. Hills, 46 Barb. (N. Y.)

340

(i866).
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appellate court, but upon another point, the main question
not being considered.7 3 In the Supreme Court of the United
States the act in question was sustained because of the reserved power,74 with an unsatisfactory joint dissenting opinion of ten lines by Justices Bradley and Field. How the
reserved power to repeal or amend the charter of the railroad company could authorize an act of the state giving to
a stockholder the right to elect seven directors instead of the
four for which its subscription had originally contracted is
apparently hopelessly beyond logical or historical justifica75
tion.

In Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466 (1882),
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Gray, the same result was
reached. A cemetery company had been incorporated by
act of Congress in the District of Columbia, its charter
being made expressly subject to the reserved power of Congress to alter or repeal it. The company, as incorporated,
was to be managed by a president and three other officers
elected annually by the proprietors. By a later act it was
provided that the management of the company should
thenceforth consist of a board of five trustees to be annually
elected, three by the proprietors of cemetery lots upon which
a burial had been made, and two by the original proprietors; it was further provided that of the gross receipts arising from the future sale of lots one-fourth should be paid
annually by the trustees to the original proprietors and the
rest be devoted to the improvement and maintenance of the
cemetery. The original proprietors objected to this act and
the Supreme Court was called upon to pass upon its constitutionality. The position might have been assumed that
"'Idem, 35 N. Y. 449 (1866).
" Miller v. The State, supra.
"It is not clear whether, in the case of City of Louisville v. University of Louisville, r5 B. Monr. (Ky.) 642 (855), the University of
Louisville's charter was subject to a reserved power. If so, that case is
contra to Miller v. The State. An amendment to the charter of the city
of Louisville gave to the city, one of the donors of the university, the
power, to the exclusion of other donors, of electing trustees of the
university. The court held that, though a part of the funds were
granted by the city, the charter constituted a contract by which the
donors, the trustees, and the state were bound, and the obligation of
which could not be impaired by subsequent legislation of the state.
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Congress was not prohibited from impairing the obligations
of contracts, and therefore the question of the reserved power
did not arise. But this was not contended, it apparently
being assumed that in the absence of this expressly reserved
power the subsequent act of Congress would have been invalid. The court sustained the constitutionality of the act
"within the principle affirmed by this court in the case of"
the Holyoke dam,76 that a power reserved to the legislature
to alter, amend, or repeal a charter authorizes it to make
any alteration or amendment of a charter granted subject
to it which will not defeat or substantially impair the object
of the grant or any rights vested under it, and which the
legislature may deem necessary to secure either that object
or any public right"-a complete ignoring of the real question lurking in the case.
The latest decision of the Supreme Court involving the
point under consideration, and in complete harmony with
the preceding cases, is Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46
(19oo). In that case the articles of association of a certain
insurance company provided that each shareholder should
be entitled to one vote for directors for every share of capital
stock held by him, and that a majority of all the votes cast
should determine the elections. Under the power reserved
in the charter of the company to alter or amend it, the legislature of Michigan, which had incorporated the company,
passed an act allowing the system of cumulative voting, a
system intended to give minority stockholders representation
on the board of directors by allowing each shareholder to
cumulate all of his votes upon one or more directors instead
of voting each share for each of the number of directors to be
chosen. This would not have been an authorized method of
voting under the original articles of association. The court
held the act constitutional on the statement (curiously
enough suggesting the essential question but not raising the
expected doubt in regard to it in the minds of the court)
that "remembering that the Dartmouth College Case
(which was the cause of the general introduction into the
7 15 Wall. 5oo (1872).
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legislation of the several states of a provision reserving the
power to alter, amend, or repeal acts of incorporation) concerned the right of a legislature to make a change in the
number and mode of appointment of the trustees or managers of a corporation, we cannot assent to the theory that
an express reservation of the general power does not secure
to the legislature the right to exercise it in this respect." It
might well be asked, "Why not?" Why is it a necessary
result that the reserved power, because inserted in the laws
of the various states to overcome the principle of the Dartmouth College decision that a charter constitutes a contract
between the state and the corporation, succeeded in the sense
that-it gave complete control to the states of the corporators'
contracts? It is boldly suggested that if the Dartmouth College Case were to arise to-day, it should, notwithstanding
the reserved power clauses, be decided exactly as it was in
fact decided in I819, only on other grounds than those on
which the opinion rested. It is likewise suggested that the
only possible method of evading the result of the Dartmouth
College Case is to repeal that section of the Federal Constitution which forbids the impairment of the obligation of
contracts, and that nothing short of such repeal can give to
the state any control over the charters or articles of association of corporators in so far as these represent their contracts inter se.
The fact that in Looker v. Maynard the act of the state
in question merely authorized the stockholders to vote cumulatively and did not compel them so to do is evidently immaterial; in fact, it makes the opinion more questionable as
a correct exposition of legal principles. It is clear that the
state cannot put into the power of a majority (or any number less than all) of the stockholders to do, in this respect,
what it cannot itself do directly' 7 If it cannot itself directly impair the contract of the corporators, still less can
"T Vice versa, however, if the state can constitutionally impose an
amendment compulsorily upon a corporation, there would seem to be
no substantial reason why it cannot do so in the shape of a permission
or offer to the majority or any other number of incorporators. See on
this point note concerning Gardner v. Hope Insurance Co., 9 R. I. 194
(i869), in the first part of this paper.
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it authorize some of them at their pleasure to change or
impair it as against their fellows. Making the act permissive instead of mandatory renders it all the more remote
from the original purpose which the reserved power clauses
were intended to accomplish. "The legislative reservation
is in the nature of a police power designed for the protection of the public welfare, and where such protection becomes necessary, the law-making power may act without
consulting either the interests or will of the company, and
in such case it may well be that not only the company but
its stockholders must submit to the legislation thus imposed
upon them," says Mr. Justice Gordon in Cross v. Peach Bottom Railway Company, 90 Pa. St. 392 (1879), and con-

tinues: "Where, however, this legislation results from the
motion and for the benefit of the corporation, the case is
different; for when an alteration in the charter is made on
the suggestion of the company itself, the Act of 1849 has
nothing to do with the case; the legislature always had such
power. The reservation in the act just named was only intended to enable the legislature to act without the consent
and against the will of the corporation."
Following or anticipating the views and authority of our
highest national tribunal, the decisions in rfiost of the state
courts are to the effect that the state may, under its reserved
power of amendment or revocation of charters of incorporation, regulate and control, either compulsorily or by way of
permission to some of the stockholders, the scheme of management of the corporation; that it may change the number
and method of election of the directors and other officers,
arrange and at its will change the proportion of control over
the management and assets that each of the corporators
is to have, dictate changes in the amount and kinds of the
capital stock of the company, and alter the scope and nature
of the corporate enterprise. Thus changes in the method of
voting among the stockholders or the forced introduction
of new corporators to voting privileges have been sanctioned
in Hyatt v. Esmond, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 6oi (1862), in
Commonwealth v. Bonsall, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 559 (1838), in
Harper v. Ampt, 32 Ohio St. 291 (1877) (dictum), in
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Cross v. West Virginia Central and Pennsylvania Railway
Co., 35 W. Va. 174 (189i), and in Gregg v. Granby Mining and Smelting Co., 164 Mo. 616 (I9OI).7 s The only

cases contra to these are to be found in the jurisdictions of
New Jersey and Kentucky. In the Matter of the Election of
Directors c the Newark Library Association, 64 N. J. L.
217 (1899), the original charter of the library association

had provided that each stockholder was to have one vote
for each share held by him not exceeding five shares, and
one vote for every five additional shares. The charter was
subject to the reserved power, and by a subsequent act the
legislature gave to the stockholders one vote for each share
held by them. The court held that the act was unconstitutional, saying, per Mr. Justice Van Syckle: " The power
reserved by the legislature in the Act of 1846 to alter, suspend, and repeal relates to those matters which concern the
public, and not to the mode of controlling the affairs of the
stockholders inter sese. The legislature may alter or repeal
the charter and extinguish the corporate existence of the
association, but it is without power to take away from the
shareholders the property which they have acquired during
its existence, and the Act of 1846 does not reserve the power
to affect or change the rights of the corporators as between
each other. The method of voting prescribed in the charter
is part of the contract between stockholders. It relates to
the manner of controlling the association and its property
represented in their shares as between themselves. It in
nowise affects the public, and it is a contract which cannot
be impaired by legislation." In Orr v. Bracken County, 81
Ky. 593 (1884), the same result, on somewhat similar facts,
was reached, although the New Jersey cases alone give a9
clear exposition of the reasons dictating this conclusion.
"'Thecases all admit that the legislature could not, in the absence of
a reserved power of amendment, authorize a majority of the stockholders to adopt the system of cumulative voting if the minority stockholders dissent. See State v. Greer, 78 Mo. i88 (1883).
'In Smith v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R. R. Co., 64 Fed. Rep.
272 (1894), a change to cumulative voting, authorized by the legislature, was held invalid as being an improper exercise of the reserved
power, where there was an express limitation on that power that its
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In questions concerning legislative changes in the internal
organization of the corporation and in the amount and kind
of its capital stock the great weight of authority similarly
follows the position taken by the Federal Supreme Court.
Some of these cases rest on the doctrine that the legislature
may, even without any reserved power of alteration, make
immaterial changes in the organization of the corporation, or
changes subserving the original purpose and intent of the
corporation, and that the changes in question in these cases
come under this class. Others of them rest on the frank,
admission that the legislation complained of would not be
sustainable but for the reserved power, which is held to
give practically complete control over the corporate organization and affairs. In Curry v. Scott, 54 Pa. St. 270
(1867), an act was sustained as against the dissent of a
minority stockholder, allowing the directors of a railroad
company to issue a preferred stock the holders of which
were to have the right to vote at all elections, and in addi- tion to the dividend first payable to them to share equally in
all remaining dividends with the common stockholders of
the company. 0 In New Haven and Derby R. R. Co. v.
Chapman, 38 Conn. 56 (0871), the state authorized the city
of New Haven to subscribe to the capital stock of a railroad
company and to appoint two directors therein, although the
original charter had provided that the stockholders were to
choose their own directors as soon as a certain amount of
the capital stock had been subscribed; this amount had been
subscribed and the company had organized and selected its
directors. The court held that the change effected by this
act of the state did not release a stockholder from liability
exercise should "in nowise conflict with any right vested in such
corporation by its charter." The decision was placed on the ground
that the right to vote stock on the non-cumulative plan had been repeatedly held to be a vested property right, and, therefore, the proposed change could not be made without the consent of all the stockholders.
'Nothing is said in the case about the reserved power of the state,
but the company was incorporated under the general Railroad Act of
1849 in Pennsylvania, and was therefore subject to the reserved power
provided for in section 20 of that act.
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to the company on his stock subscription."- In the important
cases of Berger v. United States Steel Corporation,63 N. J.
Eq. 809 (1902), and C. H. Venner Co. v. United States
Steel Corporation, 116 Fed. Rep. 1012 (I9O2), the question involved was the constitutionality of an act of the state
of New Jersey authorizing a corporation by an approving
vote of two-thirds in interest of each class of stockholders
to redeem and retire its stock. A stockholder of the United
States Steel Corporation who disapproved of this action
applied for an injunction against the two-thirds majority to
restrain them from retiring the preferred stock of the company. The injunction was refused. In the New Jersey
case the principle of In re Newark Library Association,
supra, was admitted, but the court said, by way of dictum,
that the reserved power clause in the Act of 1896, under
which Berger v. United States Steel Corporationarose, was
much broader in its scope than the Act of 1846 which had
determined the former case; -2 the decision itself, however,
was placed upon the ground that the provisions of the original charter justified the retirement of the stock in question, and that the question was not dependent, therefore,
upon the validity of the subsequent act of the legislature.
The Federal case, upon exactly the same facts, rested its
decision solely-upon the reserved power of the state, citing
and following Looker v. Maynard, supra. In several cases
' The decision was placed on the ground that the change was not
one which essentially altered the nature and character of the corporation. The extent of the state's power under its reserved right Qf
amendment of the charter was not discussed.
"It is difficult to see why. The language of the Act of 1846 was that
"the charter of every corporation which shall hereafter be granted by
the legislature shall be subject to alteration, suspension, and repeal in
the discretion of the legislature." The Act of 1896 provided, in addition to these words, that "this act may be amended or repealed at the
pleasure of the legislature, and every corporation created under this
act shall be bound by such amendment;. . . this act and all amendments
thereof shall be a part of the charter of every corporation heretofore or
hereafter formed hereunder, except so far as the same are inapplicable
and inappropriate to the objects of such corporation." It is doubtful
whether this phraseology conveys more power to the state in law than
the other, but even if so intended and so expressed, the question is not,
as has been pointed out, what power the state seeks in its constitution or
statutes to reserve over the contract of the corporators inter se, but
what amount of power it constitutionally can reserve.
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the reserved power has been held to justify authority given
by the state to a majority or other number less than all of
the stockholders to increase or reduce the capital stock as
compared with that originally agreed to by the corporators
in their articles of association; in such cases, for example,
as Joslyn v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 12 Abb. Pr. Rep.
N. S. (N. Y.) 329 (1872) ; Buffalo and New York City
R. R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 336 (1856), and Troy and
Rutland R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 581 (1854)

."

A more fundamental change in the corporate organization
was that sustained in Jackson v. Walsh, 75 Md. 304 (1892),
where the same kind of legislation was attempted as in the
Dartmouth College Case,-a provision for a greater number
of trustees, most of whom were to be officials of the state
government,-and the validity of this provision was upheld
8 ' And as
as being a valid exercise of the reserved power."
final types of this class of cases may be cited Grobe v. Erie
County Mutual Insurance Co., 169 N. Y. 613 (1899), and
Nazro v. Merchants' Mutual Insurance Company of Milwaukee, 14 Wisc. 295 (I86I), in which insurance com-

panies which had been mutual companies were authorized
to convert themselves into joint-stock companies, irithe
former case provided the president and three-fourths of the
directors so desired, although the charter originally had
provided that the assent of two-thirds of the corporators
was necessary for this purpose, and in the latter case provided the trustees of the company wished to make the
change, although the charter had not provided for the possibility of any such conversion of the organization and purpose of the corporation.85
' Contra: Zabriskie v.Hackensack and New York R. R. Co., i8 N.
J. Eq. 178 (1867).
" Contra: Sage v. Dillard, 15 B. Monr. (Ky) 340 (1854);

not so

much, however, on the ground that the state had no power over the
contract of the corporators inter se, as that "the power to alter or
amend a contract, in our conception, is to change it as between the
original parties, and such others only as have been permitted, by their
mutual consent, to come into the enjoyment of its benefits and privileges; not to compel one of the parties to operate in conjunction with
others, and share with them the privileges and benefits of the contract."
In Nazro v. Merchants' Mutual Insurancc Co. of Milwaukee the
remarks of the court on the reserved power were dicta, inasmuch as
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There are a number of cases in which, in harmony with
the general principles of the preceding examples of the perverted application of this doctrine, legislation has been upheld as valid which in other and various ways changed the
relation of the stockholders to one another by giving to
some of them as against the others more property in the
distribution of assets or more rights of various kinds than
the original articles of association had secured to them.
Thus in County fudge of Shkeby County v. Shelby R. R.
Co., 5 Bush. (Ky.) 225 (1868), a railroad company having exhausted its funds, and work on its construction being
thereby suspended, the legislature amended its charter by
authorizing the citizens of the county to subscribe to a certain amount of additional stock, and by providing that the
original stockholders should not be entitled to certain conditional interest on their stock as had been stipulated for in
the original articles of association. The court held the
act constitutional under the reserved power. The decision
is of less value as an authority in that it does not appear in
the case that any of the original stockholders objected to
the legislation reducing their right to interest on their stock.
Again, in Bailey v. Trustees of Power Street Methodist
Episcopal Church, 6 R. I. 491 (186o), a church association
was incorporated, the act providing that the trustees could
tax pewholders, provided a majority of the latter assented
thereto. Under a power of amendment reserved in the act
the legislature later altered the charter so as to allowthe trustees to impose taxes on the pewholders without the necessity
of any assent on their part. The act was sustained as a
the defendants were estopped under the particular facts of the case
from claiming that the subsequent act of the state was invalid. Contra
to these cases is Schwarzwaelder v. German Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,
.59 N. J. Eq. 589 (1899), in which the court said, also birway of dictum,
that "although the act under which the company was organized is
subject to amendment, alteration, and repeal by the legislature, yet such
amendment, alteration, or repeal can be effected only by the legislative
power of that body, and its legislative power does not extend to the
enactment of a law which impairs the obligation of a legal contract
previously made. We are, therefore, of opinion that the defendant
company has no power to transform itself into a joint-stock company
against the will of any member who acquired the right of membership
before the Act of 1899 was passed."
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proper exercise of the reserved power. As a general rule,
however, it is but fair to say that the courts have hesitated
in upholding legislation which, under the guise of the reserved power, arbitrarily changes the method of distribution of corporate assets among the stockholders. The reluctance of the courts in these cases is apparently caused,
not so much by appreciation of the argument that the state
cannot, even under a reserved power, impair the obligation
of the contract among the corporators, as by a desire to
avoid the violation of vested property rights. This is shown
in the case of Fisherv. Patton, 134 Mo. 32 (1895), in which
the by-laws of a building and loan association provided that
when the assets of the association were sufficient to make
each share worth in cash the sum of $200, the directors
should pay to each stockholder that amount for each share
owned by him on which no loan had been made, and should
then dissolve the company. The legislature, acting professedly under its reserved power of amendment, subsequently
passed an act providing that in paying out these shares the
" free or unborrowed shares shall in no case receive more
than the face value of the shares less the average premium
paid by the borrowers of the association up to date." Under
this act the plaintiff, one of the shareholders, would have
received for each of his shares $158 instead of the $200 provided for in the original by-laws of the company, and he
brought a bill in equity praying an injunction to restrain the
directors from proceeding under the act. The injunction
was granted. The coui-t admitted that the legislature had
the power, in general, to amend the charter and by-laws
made thereunder, but "we do not concede that such power
of repeal can affect contracts existing at the time the amending act is passed. The amendatory act cannot affect vested
rights, and plaintiff's rights are vested. This association,
so far as any stockholder not consenting to the amendatory
act is concerned, must be held to the agreement and contract
made, which guaranteed to each stockholder, the owner of
shares not pledged, $200 in cash on each share of stock
owned by him before or at dissolution." The same principle was involved, and the same decision reached upon the
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same reasoning, in Hill v. Glasgow R. R. Co., 41 Fed. Rep.
6Io (1888),86 where an act, passed under the reserved
power, provided that the proceeds from the sale or lease of
ihe company's railroad should, after payment of the corporate debts, be first applied in payment of certain municipal
bonds which had been given in exchange for stock of the
company issued to the municipality. "If the legislature
had, under the reserved powers, repealed the charter," said
the court, "and given the assets and property of the company, after the payment of its debts, to only two of its
stockholders, designated by name, can it admit of any question that such legislation would have been unconstitutional
and- void, so far as it undertook to dispose of the surplus
corporate property? We think not. After the payment of
debts, corporate assets belong and must be distributed'
equally and ratably among the stockholders therein, as the
beneficial owners thereof. This equality of ownership and
right of ratable distribution in surplus assets of the corporation, acquired before amendment or repeal of the company's charter, cannot be defeated or impaired by such
amendment or repeal. It is a valid right of property, which
does not fall within the power to deal with the privileges
and franchises of the corporation. The legislature could not,
by repeal or amendment of the charter, bestow all the surplus property of the corporation upon certain stockholders
to the exclusion of others; nor could it lawfully direct that
such corporate property or funds should be applied to the
payment of the indebtedness of a portion of the stockholders
of the company." 87
'It is to be noted that the reserved power in this case was qualified
by a provision that "whilst privileges and franchises so granted may
be changed or repealed, no amendment or repeal shall impair other
rights previously vested."
' See also Oldtown and Lincoln R. R. Co. v. Veazie. 39 Me. 571

(1855). The charter of a railroad company required a minimum subscription of eleven thousand shares. The defendant subscribed for
one thousand shares. Before the eleven thousand shares were subscribed for, the legislature reduced the minimum to eight thousand
shares. In an action by the company to recover assessments levied on
the defendant's shares it was held that this act released the defendant
from liability on his stock subscription, as the original minimum of
eleven thousand shares to be subscribed was a condition precedent to
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By far the most important and apparently most unjustifiable cases in which the courts have overlooked the argument contended for, that the state's reserved power over
the charter does not and cannot give to it the right to alter
be filled by the corporation before the defendant's shares were to be liable to assessment. The court said that "It is the charter only and
the rights and liabilities of the corporation and of its corporators,
as such in consequence thereof, that can be varied by an act of the
legislature, and not the private contracts made between the corporation as one party and of its corporators as the other."
It has already been pointed out that the legislature may authorize
some immaterial changes in the charter of a corporation which will not
release dissenting stockholders, even where there is in the charter or in
the laws controlling it no reservation of the power to alter or repeal
it. This is on the theory, apparently, that every contract is entered into
with reference to the possibility of slight changes to be effected therein
on the part of the legislature-in other words, that legislation with
reference to or affecting a contract does not necessarily impair it.
Many cases in which the opinion of the court rests the decision upon
the right of the legislature under the reserved power may be explained
and justified as changes in the charter which the state might have
made even in the absence of a reserved power. Such cases include
those in which the subsequent legislation of the state authorizes a
change in the name of the corporation, as in Phinney v. Trustees of
Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, 88 Md. 633 (1898) ; or extends
the time for the beginning or the completion of the undertaking foV
which the company'was chartered, as in Agricultural Branch R. R.C6.
v. Winchester, 95 Mass. 29 (I866), Poughkeepsie and Salt Point Plankroad Co. v. Griffln, 24 N. Y. i5o (I86I), Union Hotel Co. v. Hersee,
79 N. Y. 454 (188o) ; or authorizes a change of location of the principal office or place of operations of the company to another state, as in
Park v. Modern Woodinen of America, I81 Ill. 214 (1899), Bryan v.
Board of Education of the Kentucky Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 151 U. S. 639 (1893) ; or authorizes a modification of the route of a railroad company, as in Pacific R. R. Co. v. Renshaw, 18 MO. 210 (853), Pacific R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 22 Mo. 291
(I855), Story v. Jersey City and Bergen Point Plankroad Co., 16 N.
J. Eq. 13 (1863); .or authorizes a receiver who has taken charge of
the assets of an insolvent mutual insurance company to make the
assessments on the premium notes of the policy-holders that the directors of the company might have made under the charter of incorporation, as in Hyatt v. McMahon, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 457 (1857) ; or grants
to the corporation additional powers tending better to carry out the
original purposes of the company, as in Northern R. R. Co. v. Miller,
io Barb. (N. Y.) 260 (I85I), Sprigg v. Western Telegraph Co., 46 /
Md. 67 (1876) (a decision which, however, is questionable, because .
among the additional powers granted seems to have been the power
to consolidate with and to lease other lines, as to which see discussion infra).
It is clear also that the stockholders cannot plead a release of the
obligations on their contract inter se by changes in the charter which,
though material, the legislature has the right to make under its reserved power-for example, an increase in the liability of stockholders
to creditors of the company. See South Bay Meadow Dam Co. v.
Gray, 3o Me. 547 (1849).
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or impair the charter so far as it represents a contract among
the corporators, are those in which legislatures have been
allowed to change, or to authorize some of the corporators
to change, the basic purpose and nature of the enterprise for
which the company was chartered. It would seem to be
clear, beyond the necessity of proof, that where the corporators have contracted among themselves to enter into a
railroad venture, and have applied to the state for a charter
for this purpose, the state should not, merely because of the
power reserved to repeal or amend the charter, be allowed
to compel the corporators to change their business from that
of railroading to that of a general department store; or
that-where the corporators have pledged themselves to the
building and operation of a railroad between points A and B
and have receiyed a charter to enable them to do this, the
state should not be permitted to compel them, or to authorize some of them to compel the others, to change the enterprise to the construction and maintenance of a railroad between points C and D or between points A and C. And yet
the states have frequently employed the reserved power to
authorize the majority of the stockholders in a corporation
to change the scope and nature of the corporate enterprise
-in other words, have sought to give to some of the parties to a contract to which the state is not a party the right
to change that contract against the dissent of the other parties thereto-a most curious perversion of the logical and
historical purpose of the reserved power clauses! In the
case of railroads, the majority of the corporators have been
allowed to take advantage of legislative authority to change
the termini of the road from those named in the charter,
and dissenting stockholders have been held not to be released thereby from the obligations contained in their contracts of subscription to the stock of the company. s So the
majority stockholders have been given permission to sell all
of the property and assets of the corporation," and to invest
'Buffalo and New York R. R. Co. v. Dudley, I4 N. Y. 336 (i856);
Schenectady and Saratoga Plankroad Co. v. Thatcher, ii N. Y. io2
(i854); Troy and Rutland R R. Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. (N. Y.) 581
(1854).
Allen v. Ajax Mining Co., 77 Pac. Rep. (Mont.) 47 (I9o4).
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part of the capital of a railroad company in a subscription
to the stock of another road.9 0 The argument in most of
these cases is that the corporators, by becoming stockholders in a corporation whose charter is subject to the reserved
power, impliedly consent thereby to any changes which the
legislature of the state may make or authorize therein. Some
of them rest on the less objectionable assumption that the
changes authorized are not radical or fundamental-an
argument which would imply that the state might have
effected the same changes had there been no express reservation of power at all.
That this latter doctrine is not explanatory, however, of
the real position of the courts on this question is to be seen
in those cases, not few in number, in which the right of
the state is upheld to authorize, with less than a unanimous
consent of the stockholders, the consolidation of a corporation subject to the reserved power with other corporations.
If there is any change in a company which the state, in the
absence of a reserved power, could not authorize a mere
majority of the corporators to effect, it is this. The cases
are numberless and uniform in holding that a dissenting
stockholder may enjoin his fellow stockholders from changing the enterprise by consolidating with other corporations,
and thus embarking the corporate property in an undertaking other than that in which they had originally agreed to
invest it, and it is immaterial for this purpose whether or
not the state has authorized such action, since the state cannot impair the obligation of the stockholders' contract. 91
White v. Syracuse and Utica R. R. Co., 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 559
W0
"McCray v. Junction R. R. Co., 9 Ind. 358 (1857); Clearwater v.
Meredith, I Wall. 25 (1863); Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R. Co., 30
Pa. St. 42 (1858). In the last-named case the court, per Chief-Justice
Lowrie, says: "Then what valid objection can a dissenting stockholder of a private corporation have to such an arrangement as the one
now proposed? He may object that it is a violation of the contract
of association by which he and his associates agreed to become one
corporate company for a given purpose; that he united in the association for one purpose, then agreed on, and now the majority are
diverting their capital to a different. purpose. This is a violation
of chartered contracts, not the supposed one between the government
and the corporators, but the one between the corporators themselves.
He may object that his co-corporators have no power to make a new
(1853).
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Yet under the reserved power of alteration or amendment
of the corporate charter the courts have allowed this to be
done.0 2 Says the Supreme Court of California in Market
Street Railway Company v. Hellman, 1O9 Cal. 57 (1895):
" The objection that the proceedings under which the consolidation was had were violative of the constitutional rights
of non-consenting stockholders does not call for extended
comment. . . In England there is no restriction on the
power of Parliament to amend a charter. . . . In this state,

where the power is .expressly reserved to the legislature by
our constitution, the right should equally exist. The contract of the stockholders was made in view of the existence
of our constitutional provision, which entered into and
formed a part of the charter as effectually as did the statutes under which the corporations were organized." And
in a very recent case, McKee v. ChautauquaAssembly, 13o

Fed. Rep. 536 (19o4), the court says, to the same purport:
"Such changes were sanctioned by the members in advance.
Every member who enters into such an association is aware
of the reservation of the power of the legislature and of the
possibility of its exercise, and must trust to the wisdom and
justice of the legislature that the power will not be abused;
contract for him, and thereby constitute him a member of a new and
different corporation; for it is of the very nature of a contract relation that it can be instituted only by the real parties to it; unless it
be a mere constructive contract, which is only a convenient form or
fiction of law, invented to enforce a corresponding legal duty. He
may object that even the legislature cannot authorize this, for by doing
so they would authorize the destruction of one private contract, and
the compulsory creation of another in its stead, and would take away
the remedy by due course of law which the dissenting stockholder is
entitled to because of the departure or diversion of the association from
its agreed purposes, and would, besides this, change the essentialnature
of contracts, which even legislative power cannot do, and much less
legislative authority,

. .

. It is plain enough that a dissenting member

cannot thus be forced into a new corporation, and that his property in
one corporation cannot be taken from him and the stock of another
imposed upon him by way of compensation, by the act either of the
legislature or of his co-corporators, or of both combined."
rDurfee v. Old Colony and Fall River R. R. Co., 87 Mass. 23o
(1862); Bishop v. Brainerd, 28 Conn. 289 (1859); Hale v. Cheshire
R. R. Co., 161 Mass. 443 (1894); Market Street Railway Co. v. Hellnan, 1O9 Cal. 571 (1895) ; Hanna v. Cincinnati and Fort Wayne R. R.
Co., 20 nd. 3o (1863) ; McKee v. Chautauqua Assembly, 13o Fed. Rep.
536 (1904).
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and those who become members contract subject to the reservation of power, and the courts are bound to read their
agreement with the legislative condition."
If these cases be correct, we are indeed confronted with
grave possibilities in legislation. Many of the states have
recently passed consolidation acts,-acts permitting corporations to consolidate when a majority of the stockholders in
each company consents thereto. Thus in Pennsylvania the
Act of May 29, 1901 (P. L. 349), allows any two corporations to merge or consolidate, and the company born of such
consolidation is to have all of the property, rights, franchises,
and privileges thitherto possessed by either of the constituent
companies. If this act be valid as to existing corporations,
a minority stockholder may wake one morning to find that
the stock which he had bought in a railroad company has
become, by consolidation, stock in a mining company or in
a mercantile enterprise. True, some provision is made for
dissenting stockholders in that the company formed by the
consolidation may, at its option, buy the stock of such dissenting stockholders, or pay to them the damage sustained
by them as a result of the consolidation. But even this relief does not afford protection, because the option gives to
the corporation the power practically to compel the dissenting stockholders to take stock in the new company. Is such
legislation always to be sustained by the courts, as it has
been in the cases which have been cited and considered? Are
all stock investments to be placed at the mercy of the legislatures by a power which was intended to give to the state
control merely over the corporate franchises, not to privilege some of the corporators to change their contract with
their fellows? Are the states to continue to exercise this
power over private contracts-a power which the Constitution in both letter and spirit forbids to them? There are
but three cases in all the reports which, in the principles
they enunciate, hold out promise of a more rational and
saner exposition of the law.0 3 In Zabriskie v. Hackensack
"' See also dicta, however, to the same effect in Snook v. Georgia
Improvement Co., 83 Ga. 61 (1889) ; Cross v. Peach Bottom Railway
Co., go Pa. St. 392 (1879), and Mills v. Central R. R. Co. of New
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and New York R. R. Co., I8 N. J. Eq. I78 (1867), a railroad company was incorporated for the purpose of constructing and operating a railroad from Hackensack, New
Jersey, to the Peterson and Hudson River Railroad. The
charter was subject to the state's reserved power of amendment, and, acting thereunder, the legislature passed an act
authorizing the company to extend its road northwardly to
Nanent, on the line of the Erie Railway in the State of New
York. A majority of the stockholders voted to adopt this
extension of the road; a dissenting stockholder applied for
an injunction to restrain the corporation from thus extending its route. The court granted the injunction, and said, in
speaking of the state's reserved powers of amendment of
the charter: "The object and purpose of these provisions
are so plain, and so plainly expressed in the words, that it
seems strange that any doubt could be raised concerning it.
It was a reservation to the state, for the benefit of the public, to be exercised by the state only. The state was making
what had been decided to be a contract, and it reserved the
power of change, by altering, modifying, or repealing the
contract. Neither the words, nor the circumstances, nor
apparent objects for which this provision was made, can, by
any fair construction, extend it to giving a power to one
part of the corporators as against the other which they did
Jersey, 41 N. J. Eq. I (1856).

In Mowrey v. indianapolis and Cnct-

nati R. R. Co., 4 Biss. (U. S.) 78 (i866), the court intimates that the
state could not authorize a consolidation of two corporations without
the unanimous consent of the stockholders, but it is believed that a
close reading of the case will show that the decision does not extend
so far; it merely construes the act in question to require a unanimous
assent of the corporators in order to consolidate. The famous Pennsylvania College Cases, I3 Wall. i9o (871), are not in point. They
deal rather with the question as to how far the legislature can, under
the reserved power, alter a contract existing between the corporation
and a third person. The opinion contains, however, the broad dictum
that "charters of the kind may certainly be altered, modified, or
amended in all cases where the power to pass such laws is reserved in
the charter or in some antecedent general law, nor can it be doubted
that the assent of the corporation is sufficient to render such legislation
valid, unless it appears that the new legislation will have the effect to
change the control of the institution, or to divert the fund of the
donors to some new use inconsistent with the intent and purpose for
which the endowment was originally made." By "assent of the corporation" the court evidently means the assent of a majority of the
corporators.
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not have before. It was to avoid the rule in the Dartmouth
College Case, not that in Natusch v. Irving,94 that the
change was made. The words limit the power to that object. . . . The only construction to be given is, that the legislature may alter, not that the stockholders may as between
each other." Again, in Kenosha, Rockford and Rock Island
R. R. Co. v. Marsh, 17 Wisc. 13 (1863), the same principles were advocated and sustained. A railroad company
had been chartered to build a railroad from Kenosha to
Beloit in the state of Wisconsin. Subsequently the legislature authorized a change of the terminal point from Beloit
to the Wisconsin-Illinois state line, and also authorized the
company to consolidate with a railroad company incorporated in Illinois.
These changes were adopted by the
company. In an action on a stock subscription the defendant contended that these alterations in the original scope
and purpose of the company's enterprise released him from
liability, and the court upheld this contention, although the
charter of the company was subject to the reserved power
of the state. "This power," said the court, "was never reserved upon any idea that the legislature could alter a contract between a corporation and its stock subscribers, nor for
the purpose of enabling it to make such alteration. It was
solely to avoid the effect of the decision that the charter
itself was a contract between the state and the corporation,
so as to enable the state to impose such salutary restraint
upon these bodies as experience might prove to be necessary.
• . . In all cases where charters are changed, the right to
bind stock subscribers who do not assent seems to me to
derive no additional support from the fact that the power of
amending the charter had been reserved, but to depend essentially upon the question whether the change is of such a
character that it may be deemed so far in furtherance of the
original undertaking, and incidental to it, as to be fairly
within the power of the corporation to bind its individual
members by its corporate assent, or whether it is such a
departure from the original purpose that no member should
See supra, first part of paper.
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be deemed to have authorized the corporation to assent to
it for him. .

. An amendment of this kind, merely author-

izing the substitution of a new enterprise for the old, has
precisely the same effect that it would have had if there had
been no power reserved to.amend the charter. The legislature does not profess to make it obligatory. They grant it
as a power to be accepted if the company chooses to accept
it, otherwise not. This is just what they might have done
if the power of amendment had not been reserved. And it
seems to me that the question whether an individual subscriber was bound or not by the corporate assent should be
determined by the same principles in either case." And,
finally, in Dow v. NorthernR. R. Co., 36 Atl. Rep. (N. H.)
5IO (1887), there is an elaborate opinion by Chief-Justice
Doe as to the constitutionality of an act authorizing a railroad company to lease its entire road for ninety-nine years
without there being a unanimous vote of the stockholders
approving such a lease. The act was held to be invalid, and
this for the reason that the disposition in this way of all of
the assets and plant of the corporation was held to work a
radical, fundamental change in the corporate enterprise, and
therefore could be enjoined by a dissenting stockholder, even
though the charter of the company was subject to the power
on the part of the state to alter or repeal it, because this
reserved power did not and could not give to the state the
power to alter the contract of association of the corporators.
What is contended, then, in this paper is, briefly summarized, this: That the reserved power clauses were inserted in the constitutions and general statutes of the states
only in order that the states might retain power over corporations in so far as the grant of franchises-that is, the
contract between the state and the corporation-is concerned, being intended to give to the states control over
the corporation in the nature of a supervisory police power,
and to prevent a legislature from giving away irrevocable
property rights in the nature of exemptions from public
duties. That the reserved power was not introduced to
enable the state, either directly or by way of permission
given to some of the corporators as against the others, to
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alter the contract of association existing among the. stockholders of the company, even though that contract might be
formally expressed in the charter.over which the power was
reserved. That whatever, however, may have been the intention of the reserved power clauses, the state has not the
constitutional power to reserve to itself a right to alter or
repeal the contract of the corporators any more than it could
reserve such a power over the contracts of partners, of unincorporated associations, or of private contracts in general.
That, therefore, although it may be admitted that the state,
without thereby releasing dissenting stockholders, can make
immaterial changes, changes which are not radical or important, in regard to the charter contract even in so far as
it represents the contract among the corporators, yet this
power derives no additional force from the reserved power
clauses, but exists independently of them; and whatever
changes of this kind cannot be made where there is no reserved power of amendment or revocation of the charter
cannot be made by the state where such a reserved power
exists. That the state cannot gain power over a contract
over which it otherwise would have none merely because
such contract is, by an accident of history and legal procedure, formally embodied in an instrument over which, in
a different aspect, the state can legally reserve rights of
amendment or repeal; for, if it were otherwise, the states
could acquire for themselves any otherwise forbidden powers, merely by having them, or the subjects which they are
intended to concern, inserted in some form in the charters
of incorporation thereafter granted. In short, that the
stockholders are, as a group, subject, in their corporate capacity to the reserved power of the state, but that their
contract among themselves is as much.under the protection
of the Constitution forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts as is any other contract. Therefore the
state may, under the reserved power, say to a corporation,
"We enact certain amendments qualifying your original
privileges;" but it cannot say, "We enact amendments
changing the organization and nature of the enterprise of
your company as originally determined upon by your mem-
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bers ;" or to some of the stockholders, "We give to you the
privilege, if you desire to use it, of changing the contract
into which you have entered with your fellow corporators."
If these contentions be correct, almost the entire law on
the subject of the control of the states over corporations
must be rewritten. It is of importance that it should be so
rewritten, for it is submitted that the law, as it now stands,
is illogical and historically incorrect, and, further, that
under it no investments in the stock of any corporations can
safely be made, for the entire organization and purpose of a
corporation may at any time be changed by legislative enactment notwithstanding the protests of minority stockholders.
Even policy, therefore, does not dictate in this case the necessity of fallacious reasoning. There is no apparent reason
why the states should have any more power to annul or alter
corporators' contracts inter se than to revoke or amend any
other contracts. If the people of the United States think
differently, they may find means to accomplish their desire,
but it is submitted that those means are to be found only in
an amendment to the Federal Constitution limiting in this
respect the impotence of the states to impair the obligation
of contracts. It is not believed that any such amendment
would be desirable, but that, on the contrary, it would be in
the highest degree impolitic.
Horace Stern.
(To 'be concluded.)

